First degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice, premeditation and deliberation. State v. Davis, 289 N.C. 500, 223 S.E.2d 296, death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809, 97 S. Ct. 46, 50 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1976); G.S. 14-17 (Cum. Supp.1979). Generally, premeditation and deliberation must be proved by circumstantial evidence because they "are not susceptible of proof by direct evidence." State v. Love, 296 N.C. 194, 203, 250 S.E.2d 220, 226-27 (1978). Premeditation means that defendant formed the specific intent to kill the victim for some period of time, however short, before the actual killing. Deliberation means that the intent to kill was formed while defendant was in a cool state of blood and not under the influence of a violent passion suddenly aroused by sufficient provocation. State v. Biggs, 292 N.C. 328, 337, 233 S.E.2d 512, 517 (1977); State v. Hamby, 276 N.C. 674, 678, 174 S.E.2d 385, 387 (1970), death sentence vacated, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2862, 33 L. Ed. 2d 754 (1972). The term "cool state of blood" does not, in the context of determining the existence of deliberation, mean "an absence of passion and emotion.... `[A]lthough there may have been time for deliberation, if the purpose to kill was formed and immediately executed in a passion, especially if the passion was aroused by a recent provocation or by mutual combat, the murder is not deliberate and premeditated. However, passion does not always reduce the crime since a man may deliberate, may premeditate, and may intend to kill after premeditation and deliberation, although prompted and to a large extent controlled by passion at the time. If the design to kill was formed with deliberation and premeditation, it is immaterial that defendant was in a passion or excited when the design was carried into effect.'" State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 108, 118 S.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 851, 82 S. Ct. 85, 7 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1961), quoting 40 C.J.S., Homicide, s. 33(d), pp. 889, 890. Thus a killing committed during the course of a quarrel or scuffle may yet constitute first degree murder provided the defendant formed the intent to kill in a cool state of blood before the quarrel or scuffle began and the killing during the quarrel was the product of this earlier formed intent. See State v. French, 225 N.C. 276, 34 S.E.2d 157 (1945). If, however, the killing was the product of a specific intent to kill formed *796 under the influence of the provocation of the quarrel or struggle itself, then there would be no deliberation and hence no murder in the first degree. Id.
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